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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement following the denial of his motion to
suppress, forty-five-year-old James Edwin Wolfe pleaded guilty to felony possession of
a controlled substance. The district court imposed a unified sentence of six years, with
three years fixed, suspended the sentence, and placed Mr. Wolfe on probation for a
period of three years. On appeal, Mr. Wolfe asserts the district court erred when it
denied his motion to suppress.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
According to the district court’s findings of fact delivered at the motion to
suppress hearing, a motorhome and PT Cruiser car pulled over on Interstate 90 after
law enforcement used their lights to indicate the PT Cruiser should pull over.1 (See Tr.,
Oct. 20, 2014, p.10, Ls.8-10. See generally State’s Ex. A (video recording of the traffic
stop).) The motorhome parked ahead of the PT Cruiser on the side of the highway.
(Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.10, Ls.15-17.)

Kootenai County Sheriff’s Deputy Nelson

approached the driver of the PT Cruiser, Joseph Schabow, Jr. (hereinafter, Joseph),
and learned he was heading to North Dakota. (See Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.10, Ls.17-21;
R., p.85.)

Joseph Schabow, Sr. (hereinafter, Mr. Schabow), the driver of the

motorhome, stepped from the motorhome as if to approach Deputy Nelson while he was
speaking to Joseph. (See Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.10, L.22 – p.11, L.1.) Deputy Nelson
told Mr. Schabow: “Hey man, just wait in your car for me, alright? I appreciate it.” (See

The police pulled over the PT Cruiser for following too closely behind the motorhome.
(See Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.11, Ls.8-10.)

1

1

Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.11, Ls.1-4; R., pp.86-87; State’s Ex. A, 01:10 – 01:20.)
Mr. Schabow returned to the motorhome. (See R., p.87.)
Joseph indicated that Mr. Schabow was his father and they were on their way to
North Dakota to look for jobs. (Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.11, Ls.5-7.) Deputy Nelson told
Joseph he had been stopped for following the motorhome too closely, and received
Joseph’s driver’s license, registration and proof of insurance. (See Tr., Oct. 20, 2014,
p.11, Ls.8-12.) Deputy Nelson then approached the motorhome and stated he had not
pulled over the motorhome, but Mr. Schabow told the deputy he pulled over because
Joseph was his son. (See Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.11, Ls.13-19; R., p.87.) Upon being
asked if he had a driver’s license, Mr. Schabow provided Deputy Nelson his driver’s
license. (See Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.11, Ls.24-25; R., p.87.)
After other deputies arrived and Deputy Nelson returned to his patrol car, Mr. Wolfe,
who was Joseph’s cousin and a passenger in the motorhome, stepped out of the
motorhome and began to walk towards the deputy, who told Mr. Wolfe to wait in the
motorhome.2 (See Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.12, Ls.1-5, p.13, Ls.1-7; R., pp.87-88.) Deputy
Nelson directed Deputy Hyle to check Mr. Schabow’s information. (See Tr., Oct. 20,
2014, p.12, Ls.6-10; R., p.88.) While that was being done, Deputy Nelson ran his drug
dog around the motorhome, and the drug dog alerted. (See Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.12,
Ls.10-12.)
Officers then removed Mr. Schabow and Mr. Wolfe from the motorhome.3 (See
R., pp.88-89.) The officers pat searched Mr. Schabow and Mr. Wolfe, finding nothing.

The State argued Mr. Schabow exited the motorhome at this time. (See R., p.88.)
Because the district court did not make specific findings of fact on what happened
after the drug dog alerted (see Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.10, L.3 – p.14, L.25), the facts in

2
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(See R., p.89.)

Deputy Ballman told Mr. Wolfe they were about to search the

motorhome, and Mr. Wolfe reportedly stated a small amount of marijuana and a bong
were inside.

(See R., p.89.)

Deputies Nelson and Ballman then searched the

motorhome, and found marijuana, methamphetamine, and several pieces of drug
paraphernalia. (See R., p.89.) Mr. Wolfe was handcuffed and placed in the back of a
patrol car. (See R., p.89.) After Deputy Ballman advised Mr. Wolfe of his Miranda
rights,4 Mr. Wolfe stated he understood those rights. (See R., p.89.) Mr. Wolfe then
reportedly stated the drugs and drug paraphernalia belonged to him. (See R., p.89.)
The State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging Mr. Wolfe had committed one count of
possession of a controlled substance, felony, in violation of Idaho Code § 37-2732(c)(1).
(R., pp.43-44.) After Mr. Wolfe waived a preliminary hearing, the magistrate bound him
over to the district court. (R., pp.51-52.) The State then filed an Information charging
Mr. Wolfe with one count of felony possession of a controlled substance, and one count
of possession of drug paraphernalia, misdemeanor, in violation of I.C. § 37-2734A. (R.,
pp.53-54.)
Mr. Wolfe filed a Motion to Suppress and Notice of Hearing. (R., pp.61-63.) The
grounds for the motion included “that the arrest, search and interrogation and/or the
statements elicited from the Defendant violated the 4th, 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments of
the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho State Constitution and
related provisions and statutes regarding search and seizure, self-incrimination and
right to counsel,” and “that the warrantless search of the Defendant’s passenger

this paragraph are taken from the State’s Amended Memorandum in Opposition to
Motion to Suppress. (See R., pp.85-98.)
4 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3

compartment after the Defendant had been removed from the vehicle, handcuffed, and
no longer had access the passenger compartment constituted an Unreasonable Search
and Seizure” under Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). (R., pp.61-62.)
Before Mr. Wolfe filed a memorandum in support of the motion to suppress, the
State filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Suppress. (R., pp.64-72.) The
State argued Mr. Wolfe did not have standing to challenge the validity of the traffic stop,
probable cause existed to search the motorhome after Deputy Nelson’s drug dog
alerted to the odor of a controlled substance coming from the motor home, and
Mr. Wolfe knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to remain silent when
he chose to answer Deputy Ballman’s questions after being advised of his Miranda
rights and acknowledging he understood them. (R., pp.69-71.)
Mr. Wolfe subsequently filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities.
(R., pp.75-79.) Mr. Wolfe asserted the occupants of the motorhome were detained
without reasonable suspicion or probable cause and were not free to leave at the point
Deputy Nelson took Mr. Schabow’s driver’s license.

(R., p.77.)

He asserted the

detention continued with the drug dog sniff, his arrest, the search of the motorhome,
and his custodial interrogation. (R., p.77.) Mr. Wolfe further asserted the probable
cause for the search, and his statements, were obtained after an unlawful detention and
therefore invalid as the fruit of the poisonous tree.

(R., p.78.)

He asserted his

statements and the evidence obtained in the search of the motorhome should be
suppressed. (R., p.78.) The Memorandum of Points and Authorities did not mention
Arizona v. Gant. (See R., pp.75-78.)

4

The State then filed an Amended Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to
Suppress. (R., pp.85-98.) The State conceded that any seizure of Mr. Schabow was
also a seizure of Mr. Wolfe. (R., pp.89-90.) The State argued that Deputy Nelson’s
initial contact with Mr. Schabow was voluntary.

(R., p.94.)

Assuming a seizure

occurred when Deputy Nelson took Mr. Schabow’s license and told him to remain in the
vehicle, the State contended the seizure was limited and reasonable. (R., p.94.) The
State next argued the drug dog sniff did not extend the duration of the seizure or delay
the driver’s license check, because Deputy Nelson directed Deputy Hyle to check the
license while Deputy Nelson did the drug dog sniff. (R., p.94.)
The State further contended the warrantless search of the motorhome was based on
probable cause, thanks to the drug dog’s alert. (R., pp.94-96.) The State argued the
drug dog “is a well-trained, reliable, Idaho Certified drug detection dog.” (R., p.88 n.7,
p.95.) The State also argued the custodial interrogation of Mr. Wolfe was not fruit of the
poisonous tree, and that the search of the motorhome was not conducted incident to
arrest, but conducted after Deputy Nelson obtained probable cause from the drug dog
sniff.

(R., pp.96-97.)

The State requested the district court deny the motion to

suppress. (R., p.97.)
At a hearing, the parties agreed, in lieu of a factual hearing, to submit a DVD of the
video recording of the incident (State’s Exhibit A) as the factual basis for the search,
stop, and seizure.5 (See Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.4, L.16 – p.6, L.17; R., p.107.) The
parties also stipulated that Deputy Nelson did not return Mr. Schabow’s driver’s license,

The State informed the district court that there was audio on the recording only
between the first and seventh minutes into the footage. (Tr., Oct. 2, 2014, p.5, Ls.8-12.)

5
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and that there was no consent to the search.6 (See R., p.107; Tr., Oct. 2, 2014, p.6,
L.21 – p.7, L.2.)
After reviewing the stipulated DVD, the district court held a motion to suppress hearing
where it delivered its findings of fact. (See R., p.110.) During the hearing, Mr. Wolfe
asserted a seizure occurred when Deputy Nelson told Mr. Schabow to wait in the
motorhome. (See Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.4, L.13 – p.5, L.11.) Mr. Wolfe also asserted
there was no evidence the drug dog was certified, but the district court declined to
address that issue because it was “a completely new issue that would need to be raised
by a motion and briefing and notice to the Court and notice to the other side to be ready
for it.” (Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.5, Ls.12-20, p.6, Ls.2-8.) Additionally, Mr. Wolfe asserted
the initial contact with the deputy was non-consensual, he was ordered to stop and
remain without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and everything that flowed after
that was fruit of the poisonous tree. (Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.5, L.21 – p.6, L.1.)
The State argued the initial contact was voluntary, any seizure there was limited and
short-term, and the taking of Mr. Schabow’s driver’s license was a limited seizure under
State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491 (1992), and not against the Fourth Amendment. (See
Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.6, L.11 – p.8, L.8.)

The State further argued there was no

unlawfully-extended detention, unlawful search or fruit of the poisonous tree, and that
Arizona v. Gant did not apply because the search was before the arrest. (Tr., Oct. 20,
2014, p.8, L.22 – p.9, L.12.)

The audio begins again about fifteen minutes into the footage, and ends around
seventeen minutes in. (See State’s Ex. A, 14:50 – 17:20).
6 The district court directed the parties to submit a written stipulation of fact (Tr., Oct. 2,
2014, p.7, Ls.3-8), but it does not appear the parties complied with that directive.
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After delivering its findings of fact, the district court made “the conclusory finding that the
stopping of the motorhome was voluntary by the motorhome driver. It was, therefore, a
consensual encounter between the occupants of the motorhome and the law
enforcement officer.” (Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.12, Ls.21-25.)
The district court also determined Deputy Nelson’s statements to Mr. Schabow and
Mr. Wolfe about waiting in the motorhome constituted “directions about what those
individuals could do at that scene, but not prohibitions from those individuals driving off.”
(Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.13, Ls.1-12.)

The district court likened Deputy Nelson’s

statements to a hypothetical situation where an officer told a bystander observing an
incident involving police interaction with other citizens to not join the conversation.
(Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.13, Ls.13-20.)
Thus, the district court found
there was, in fact, no detention of Mr. Wolfe as the passenger in the
motorhome until such time that, purportedly, the dog alerted on that
motorhome, and then there became a probable cause to believe that there
was contraband in that motorhome, and there was, therefore, reasonable
suspicion, or even probable cause to detain those occupants further and
to ultimately arrest them.
(Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.14, Ls.2-9.)

The district court also “does not find that any

statements made by Mr. Wolfe were the fruit of a poisonous, unlawful or unreasonable
detention or arrest.” (Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.14, Ls.10-14.)
The district court was persuaded by Godwin “that even in a consensual
encounter, the obtaining of driver’s license, proof of insurance and registration of a
vehicle does not shift that consensual encounter into a detention.” (Tr., Oct. 20, 2014,
p.14, Ls.15-19.) Thus, it was “not unreasonable . . . for the law enforcement to do that.”

7

(Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.14, Ls.19-21.) The district court therefore denied Mr. Wolfe’s
motion to suppress. (Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.14, Ls.21-22; R., pp.114-15.)
Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement, Mr. Wolfe agreed to plead guilty to
possession of a controlled substance, while preserving his right to appeal the denial of
the motion to suppress. (R., pp.111-12.)

The district court accepted the guilty plea.

(R., p.111.) The district court later imposed a unified sentence of six years, with three
years fixed, suspended the sentence, and placed Mr. Wolfe on probation for a period of
three years. (R., pp.131-36.)
Mr. Wolfe filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment –
Suspended Execution. (R., pp.139-41.)

8

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Wolfe’s motion to suppress?

9

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Wolfe’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Mr. Wolfe asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress,

because his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
was violated. Contrary to the district court’s determination, Mr. Wolfe was seized when
Deputy Nelson ordered Mr. Schabow to wait for the deputy in the motorhome and Mr.
Schabow complied with the order. The seizure of Mr. Wolfe was illegal because it was
not justified by reasonable, articulable suspicion. The taking of Mr. Schabow’s driver’s
license was unreasonable because it came after the illegal seizure. Even if Mr. Wolfe
were not illegally seized, the search of the motorhome was illegal because probable
cause for the search did not exist. Mr. Wolfe’s incriminating statements should have
been suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree. Thus, Mr. Wolfe’s constitutional
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was violated, and the district
court erred when it denied his motion to suppress.
B.

Standard Of Review And Applicable Law
The standard of review for a motion to suppress is bifurcated. An appellate court

defers to the trial court’s findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous, and
freely reviews the trial court’s application of constitutional principles to the facts as
found. State v. Hankey, 134 Idaho 844, 846 (2000).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho
Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.
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U.S. Const. amend. IV;

Idaho Const. art. I, § 17.

Evidence obtained in violation of these constitutional

protections generally may not be used as evidence against the victim of the illegal
government action. See State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 518-19 (2012); State v. Bishop,
146 Idaho 804, 810-11 (2009).
“Any warrantless search or seizure of a citizen is presumptively unreasonable unless if
falls within certain specific and well-delineated exceptions. Halen v. State, 136 Idaho
829, 833 (2002).

“When a warrantless search or seizure is challenged by the

defendant, the State bears the burden to show that a recognized exception to the
warrant requirement is applicable.” Id.
C.

Mr. Wolfe Was Seized In The Initial Encounter With The Police, When
Mr. Schabow Submitted To Deputy Nelson’s Show Of Authority By Waiting For
The Deputy In The Motorhome As The Deputy Ordered
Mr. Wolfe asserts he was seized in the initial encounter with the police, contrary

to the district court’s determination. The district court determined that Mr. Wolfe was not
seized until the officers detained him following the drug dog’s alert. (See Tr., Oct. 20,
2014, p.14, Ls.2-5.)

But Mr. Wolfe was actually seized when Deputy Nelson told

Mr. Schabow to wait for the deputy in the motorhome and Mr. Schabow complied.
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Wolfe asserts he was seized when Deputy Nelson
seized Mr. Schabow. The State conceded before the district court “that any seizure of
Mr. Schabow, Sr., as the driver of the motor home, was also a seizure of the occupants
of the motor home (the Defendant).” (R., pp.89-90 (citing State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho
647, 651-53 (Ct. App. 2002).) In Gutierrez, the Idaho Court of Appeals held: “Because
the stop of a vehicle and detention of its driver is generally a detention of any
passengers as well, passengers have standing to contest the reasonableness of the
11

detention.”

Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 650.

Based on Gutierrez and the State’s

concession before the district court, Mr. Wolfe was seized when Deputy Nelson seized
Mr. Schabow.
Here, Mr. Schabow and Mr. Wolfe were seized when Deputy Nelson told
Mr. Schabow to wait for the deputy in the motorhome and Mr. Schabow complied.
“When a defendant seeks to suppress evidence that is alleged to have been obtained
as a result of an illegal seizure, the defendant bears the burden of proving that a seizure
occurred.” State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 486 (2009). A seizure occurs where an
officer restrains the liberty of a citizen either through the officer’s “laying on of hands or
application of physical force to restrain movement, even when it is ultimately
unsuccessful,” or the citizen’s submission to the officer’s “show of authority.” California
v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991); State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 659 (2007).
“The test for deciding whether someone has been seized by a show of authority is an
objective one.” State v. Baker, 141 Idaho 163, 165 (2004) (citing United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1980)). A seizure by a show of authority occurs
“only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave.”

Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted).
A seizure occurs by submission to a show of authority where an officer orders a
citizen to wait for the officer at a particular place, and the citizen complies with the order.
See, e.g., United States v. Coggins, 986 F.2d 651, 654 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding a seizure
occurred when the defendant asked to leave while under questioning by an officer, the
officer ordered the defendant to stay, and the defendant complied by sitting back down);

12

Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 223 (Wyo. 1994) (holding a seizure occurred when the
defendant complied with an officer’s order to wait at a specific street corner in view of
the officer); State v. Barnes, 978 P.2d 1131, 1133, 1135-36 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding a seizure occurred where an officer ordered the defendant to wait while the
officer checked on whether the defendant had an outstanding warrant, the defendant
remained at the scene, and the officer did not actually tell the defendant he was free to
leave). Cf. State v. Agundis, 127 Idaho 587, 591-93 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding no seizure
occurred where the defendant did not submit to a police command to stop). Under such
circumstances, a reasonable person would not believe he or she was free to leave. See
Coggins, 986 F.2d at 654; Wilson, 874 P.2d at 223; Barnes, P.2d at 1135-36.
Here, at the onset of the encounter with the police,7 Deputy Nelson ordered
Mr. Schabow to wait for the deputy in a particular place by giving the following order:
“Hey man, just wait in your car for me, alright? I appreciate it.” (See R., pp.86-87;
State’s Ex. A, 01:10 – 01:20.)

Thus, Deputy Nelson ordered Mr. Schabow to wait for

the deputy in the motorhome without telling Mr. Schabow he was free to leave. (See R.,
pp.86-87.)

Mr. Schabow complied with the order by waiting in the motorhome for

Deputy Nelson.

(See R., p.87.)

In view of all the surrounding circumstances, a

reasonable person in Mr. Schabow’s position would have believed he was not free to
leave. See Coggins, 986 F.2d at 654; Wilson 874 P.2d at 223; Barnes, 978 P.2d at
1135-36.

According to the district court’s findings of fact, Deputy Nelson later told Mr. Wolfe to
wait in the motorhome, after the deputy took Mr. Schabow’s driver’s license. (See
Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.11, L.24 – p.12, L.5, p.13, Ls.1-7.)

7
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Thus, a seizure occurred when Mr. Schabow submitted to Deputy Nelson’s show
of authority. See Baker, 141 Idaho at 165. Deputy Nelson also seized Mr. Wolfe at that
point in the encounter with the police because Mr. Wolfe was a passenger in
Mr. Schabow’s motorhome. See Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 650.
While the district court compared the initial encounter here to a hypothetical situation
involving an officer telling a bystander not to join an ongoing conversation between the
officer and other citizens (see Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.13, L.13 – p.14, L.1), the two
circumstances are readily distinguishable.

In the district court’s hypothetical, the

bystander was not ordered by the officer to wait for the officer at a particular place.
Rather, the officer simply told the onlooker, “Don’t come join this conversation, stay
back, don’t come join us.” (Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.13, Ls.19-20.) Conversely, Deputy
Nelson in this case ordered Mr. Schabow to wait for the deputy at a particular place,
namely in the motorhome. (See R., pp.86-87.) The present case is therefore readily
distinguishable from the district court’s hypothetical.
In sum, Mr. Wolfe was seized when Mr. Schabow submitted to Deputy Nelson’s show of
authority by complying with the deputy’s order to wait for the deputy in the motorhome.
The district court’s determination on when Mr. Wolfe was seized was incorrect.
D.

The Seizure Of Mr. Wolfe Was Illegal Because It Was Not Justified By
Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion
Mr. Wolfe asserts that his seizure was illegal because it was not justified by

reasonable, articulable suspicion. At a minimum, a seizure of any individual requires
reasonable and articulable suspicion.

Willoughby, 147 Idaho at 490.

“Typically,

seizures must be based on probable cause to be reasonable.” Bishop, 146 Idaho at

14

811.

But under an exception to the warrant requirement, “limited investigatory

detentions, based on less than probable cause, are permissible when justified by an
officer’s reasonable articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is about to
commit, a crime.” See id. (explaining the standard under the Fourth Amendment); State
v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 896-97 (1991) (articulating essentially the same standard
under Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution). “Reasonable suspicion must be based
on specific, articulable facts and the rational inferences that can be drawn from those
facts.”

Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811.

While reasonable suspicion is a less-exacting

standard than probable cause, it still “requires more than a mere hunch or inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

“The test for

reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer
at or before the time of the stop.” Id.
The seizure of Mr. Wolfe was not justified by reasonable, articulable suspicion.
At the time of the seizure, all Deputy Nelson knew was that the motorhome had pulled
over after he stopped the PT Cruiser on suspicion of following too closely, and that the
motorhome’s driver had tried to approach where the deputy had stopped the PT
Cruiser. (See R., pp.86-87.) Thus, there were no specific, articulable facts, much less
rational inferences that could be drawn from such facts, that would support reasonable,
articulable suspicion that an occupant of the motorhome had committed, or was about
to commit, a crime.

See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811.

Based on the totality of the

circumstances known to Deputy Nelson at or before the time of the detention, there was
no reasonable suspicion justifying Mr. Wolfe’s seizure. See id.
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Thus, the seizure of Mr. Wolfe was illegal because it was not justified by
reasonable, articulable suspicion.
presumptively unreasonable.

As discussed above, warrantless seizures are

See Halen, 136 Idaho at 833.

When a defendant

challenges a warrantless seizure, “the State bears the burden to show that a recognized
exception to the warrant requirement is applicable.” Id. Here, Mr. Wolfe was seized
without a warrant, the warrantless seizure was not justified by reasonable, articulable
suspicion, and no other exceptions to the warrant requirement are applicable. The
seizure of Mr. Wolfe was unreasonable and therefore illegal under the Fourth
Amendment and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution.
E.

The Taking of Mr. Schabow’s Driver’s License Was Unreasonable Because It
Came After Deputy Nelson’s Illegal Seizure
Mr. Wolfe asserts the taking of Mr. Schabow’s driver’s license was unreasonable

because it came after Deputy Nelson’s illegal seizure of Mr. Schabow and Mr. Wolfe.
Although the district court determined, based on its reading of State v. Godwin, 121
Idaho 491 (1992), that the taking of the driver’s license here was not a detention (see
Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.14, Ls.15-19), the Godwin Court actually held the taking of a
driver’s license is a limited seizure. Godwin, 121 Idaho at 493. Further, Godwin only
provides the taking of a driver’s license is reasonable if the taking comes after a valid,
lawful contact with the driver. Here, the taking of Mr. Schabow’s driver’s license came
after Deputy Nelson’s illegal seizure of Mr. Schabow and Mr. Wolfe. Thus, Godwin
does not establish the taking here was reasonable. Without support from Godwin or
any other justification, the taking of Mr. Schabow’s driver’s license was unreasonable.
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The Idaho Supreme Court held in Godwin that a limited seizure occurs when an
officer takes a citizen’s driver’s license and tells the citizen to wait in his car. Godwin,
121 Idaho at 493. In Godwin, the defendant pulled over his car ahead of another
vehicle some time after officers stopped that vehicle for an equipment violation. Id. at
491-92. The driver of the stopped vehicle told the officers she believed her driver’s
license was in the defendant’s car. Id. at 492. An officer approached the defendant’s
car, and after the officer and defendant were unable to find the other driver’s license,
the officer took the defendant’s driver’s license for a status check.

Id.

The Court

concluded “a limited seizure occurred when [the officer] took [the defendant’s] license
and told him to remain in his car. At this point, [the defendant] was arguably not free to
leave.” Id. at 493.
The Godwin Court then concluded that limited seizure was reasonable. Id. at 493, 495.
After balancing the public interests at stake against the defendant’s right to personal
security from arbitrary interference by officers, the Court held “that a police officer’s brief
detention of a driver to run a status check on the driver’s license, after making a valid,
lawful contact with the driver, is reasonable for purposes of the fourth amendment.” Id.
at 495. The Court observed its view was “consistent with a uniform body of court
decisions in other states that a police officer who has made an otherwise appropriate
contact with a motorist, may request the motorist’s license and run a check on that
license without violating the driver’s Fourth Amendment rights.” Id. The Godwin Court
also held that the officers did not stop the defendant, but the defendant voluntarily
pulled over to wait for the other driver. Id. at 496.
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Despite the superficial similarities between the facts in Godwin and in this case, Godwin
does not establish the taking of Mr. Schabow’s driver’s license was reasonable,
because the taking here did not come after a valid, lawful contact with the police. To
the extent it was even permissible, any taking of Mr. Schabow’s driver’s license was a
seizure. See Godwin, 121 Idaho at 493. However, unlike the defendant in Godwin,
Mr. Schabow and Mr. Wolfe were already seized before Deputy Nelson took
Mr. Schabow’s driver’s license. Cf. Godwin, 121 Idaho at 491-92, 496. As explained
above, that seizure was an illegal seizure unjustified by reasonable suspicion. Thus,
Godwin does not establish the taking here was reasonable. But see Godwin, 121 Idaho
at 495-96 (discussing I.C. § 49-316, which requires drivers to surrender driver’s licenses
to police officers upon demand, as implicitly recognizing the public interest in allowing
officers to ask for and check driver’s licenses). Without support from Godwin or any
other justification, the taking of Mr. Schabow’s driver’s license was unreasonable.
F.

The Search Of The Motorhome Was Illegal Because Probable Cause To Search
The Motorhome Did Not Exist
Even if Mr. Wolfe were not illegally seized, he asserts the search of the

motorhome was illegal because probable cause to search the motorhome did not exist.
The district court’s decision not to address the issue of the drug dog’s certification was
incorrect, because the State had the burden of showing an exception to the warrant
requirement applied. To meet that burden, the State argued probable cause justified
the search, the drug dog was reliable and certified, and the drug dog’s alert was the
source of probable cause for the search. However, the State offered no evidence that
the drug dog was certified or otherwise reliable, meaning the drug dog’s alert did not, in

18

and of itself, provide probable cause. The totality of the circumstances also did not
provide probable cause for the search. Because probable cause did not exist for the
search, the warrantless search of the motorhome was illegal.
As explored above, “[w]arrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable
unless they fall within one of several narrowly drawn exceptions.” State v. Anderson,
154 Idaho 703, 706 (2012).

“One of these exceptions, the ‘automobile exception,’

allows police to search a vehicle without a warrant when there is probable cause to
believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime.” Id. “Probable cause is
established when the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the
search would give rise—in the mind of a reasonable person—to a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Id. The probable
cause standard “is a flexible, common-sense standard” that only requires “a practical,
nontechnical probability that incriminating evidence is present.” Id.
1.

The District Court Should Have Addressed The Issue Of The Drug Dog’s
Certification

Mr. Wolfe asserts the district court should have addressed the issue of the drug
dog’s certification. The district court incorrectly determined that it would not address the
issue of the drug dog’s certification because it was “a completely new issue” not raised
with a motion and briefing and notice to the district court or notice to the State. (See
Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.6, Ls.2-8.) The district court also stated: “But that’s not the issue
that’s been raised before the Court, as to whether the dog is certified in the discipline for
which it’s used.” (Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.12, Ls.12-14.) Contrary to the district court’s
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determination, the issue was not a new issue because the State had argued the drug
dog’s alert provided probable cause for the search of the motorhome.
“When a warrantless search or seizure is challenged by the defendant, the State bears
the burden to show that a recognized exception to the warrant requirement is
applicable.”

Halen, 136 Idaho at 833.

The State, in opposition to the motion to

suppress, argued the warrantless search of the motorhome was based on probable
cause. (R., pp.94-96.) Thus, the State had the burden of showing probable cause
existed for the search.
In its attempt to meet that burden, the State contended the drug dog’s alert, in and of
itself, provided probable cause for the search. The State argued the drug dog “is a welltrained, reliable, Idaho Certified drug detection dog.” (R., p.88 n.7, p.95.) The State
then specifically contended the source of probable cause for the search was the drug
dog’s alert: “Only after Deputy Nelson had probable cause, after the K9 positively
indicated to the odor of a controlled substance emitting from the motor home, was the
motor home searched.” (R., pp.95-96.) Further, the district court accepted the State’s
argument, having found probable cause for the search based on the drug dog’s alert.
(See Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.14, Ls.4-9.) Thus, the issue of the drug dog’s certification
was not a new issue, and the district court should have addressed it.

20

2.

Probable Cause Did Not Exist For The Search Of The Motorhome

Mr. Wolfe asserts probable cause did not exist for the search of the motorhome.
The State offered no evidence that the drug dog was certified or otherwise reliable,
meaning the drug dog’s alert did not, in and of itself, provide probable cause. The
totality of the circumstances also did not provide probable cause for the search.
Under the automobile exception, “[a] reliable drug dog’s alert on the exterior of a vehicle
is sufficient, in and of itself, to establish probable cause for a warrantless search of the
interior.” Anderson, 154 Idaho at 706; see State v. Yeoumans, 144 Idaho 871, 873
(Ct. App. 2007).

The United States Supreme Court has clarified the standards for

assessing a drug dog’s reliability, holding “evidence of a dog’s satisfactory performance
in a certification or training program can itself provide sufficient reason to trust his alert.”
Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1057 (2013). The Harris Court continued: “If a bona
fide organization has certified a dog after testing his reliability in a controlled setting, a
court can presume (subject to any conflicting evidence offered) that the dog’s alert
provides probable cause to search.” Id. Further, a drug dog is presumed reliable “even
if the absence of formal certification, if the dog has recently and successfully completed
a training program that evaluated his proficiency in locating drugs.” Id.
However, the Harris Court also emphasized that defendants “must have an
opportunity to challenge such evidence of a dog’s reliability, whether by crossexamining the testifying officer or by introducing his own fact or expert witnesses.” Id.
Defendants could challenge the adequacy of a certification or training program, examine
how drug dogs or their handlers performed in their assessments made in those settings,
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or assert the circumstances surrounding a particular alert undermined the case for
probable cause. See id.
In sum, the Harris Court held that “[i]f the State has produced proof from controlled
settings that a dog performs reliably in detecting drugs, and the defendant has not
contested that showing, then the court should find probable cause.” Id. “If, in contrast,
the defendant has challenged the State’s case (by disputing the reliability of the dog
overall or of a particular alert), then the court should weigh the competing evidence.” Id.
The question in this probable cause inquiry, the Court explained, “is whether all the
facts surrounding a dog’s alert, viewed through the lens of common sentence, would
make a reasonably prudent person think that a search would reveal contraband or
evidence of a crime. A sniff is up to snuff when it meets that test.” Id.
Here, the drug dog’s sniff was not up to snuff. Under Harris, Mr. Wolfe could challenge
the reliability of the drug dog by pointing to the lack of evidence that the drug dog was
certified. See Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1058. The Harris Court highlighted how “evidence of
a dog’s satisfactory performance in a certification or training program can itself provide
sufficient reason to trust his alert.” Id.
The Harris Court held the record in that case supported the trial court’s determination
that the drug dog’s alert gave probable cause for an officer to search the defendant’s
truck, because the State “introduced substantial evidence of [the drug dog’s] training
and his proficiency in finding drugs.” Id. The State in Harris showed the drug dog
successfully completed a 120-hour program in narcotic detection, separately obtained a
certification from an independent company, and engaged in continuing training after the
expiration of the certification. Id. The handling officer’s testimony and written records
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showed the drug dog always performed at the highest level in its continuing training. Id.
Additionally, the defendant in Harris did not challenge in the trial court any aspect of the
drug dog’s training, and the defendant’s cross-examination of the officer did not rebut
the State’s case. Id.
Similarly, in State v. Braendle, 134 Idaho 173 (Ct. App. 2000), the Idaho Court of
Appeals held “[t]he reaction of the drug detection dog provided the probable cause to
justify the search” of the defendant’s truck, which revealed marijuana and paraphernalia
inside. Braendle, 134 Idaho at 174, 176. The Braendle Court held that, “although there
was conflicting evidence, in light of the testimony given by the detective [who conducted
the search with the dog], the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
a sufficient foundation had been established” for admitting evidence of the drug dog
alerting on the defendant’s truck. Id. at 176. The State had presented the detective’s
testimony on how the drug dog had been professionally trained and used as a narcotics
dog for three or four years before the detective started working with it, and the detective
and dog had an additional 180 hours of training together. Id. at 175. The detective also
testified that in previous controlled testing and training, the drug dog alerted only on
containers that held illegal drugs. Id. The defendant in Braendle challenged the drug
dog reliability’s with testimony that the dog once alerted on school lockers where no
drugs were found. Id. at 175-76. The detective in rebuttal testified that the drug dog
might have alerted on a lingering odor of drugs in the lockers, based on the fact that the
dog did not give false positive responses in controlled settings. Id. at 176.
The State in this case, rather than offer the drug dog’s certification, testimony from the
dog’s handler, or other evidence of the dog’s reliability, only furnished conclusory
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statements that the drug dog “is a well-trained, reliable, Idaho Certified drug detection
dog.” (See R., p.88 n.7, p.95.) Those conclusory statements were insufficient to show
the drug dog was certified or otherwise reliable.8

Cf. Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1058;

Braendle, 134 Idaho at 175-76. Because the State did not provide sufficient evidence of
the drug dog’s certification or reliability, the State could not rely on the drug dog’s alert,
in and of itself, to provide probable cause for the search of the motorhome. See Harris,
133 S. Ct. at 1058. The sniff was not up to snuff.
The totality of the circumstances here also did not provide probable cause for the
search.

Apart from the drug dog’s alert, the district court did not find other facts that

would cause a reasonably prudent person to think a search would reveal contraband or
evidence of a crime in the motorhome. See Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1058; Anderson, 154
Idaho at 706.
Because probable cause did not exist to justify the search of the motorhome under the
automobile exception, and another exception to the warrant requirement was not
applicable, the warrantless search of the motorhome was illegal.9 See Anderson, 154
Idaho at 706.
The search of the motorhome was illegal because probable cause did not exist. The
district court incorrectly decided not to address the issue of the drug dog’s certification,
because the State attempted to meet its burden of justifying the warrantless search by

The parties stipulated to submit the video recording of the stop as the factual basis
for the search, stop, and seizure, and no testimony from the drug dog’s handling
officer or other evidence on the drug dog’s reliability was provided to the district court.
(See, e.g., R., p.107; Tr., Oct. 2, 2014, p.5, Ls.13-14.)
9 The State conceded the motorhome was not searched incident to arrest under
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332. (See R. p.96.)
8
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arguing the drug dog’s alert provided probable cause and therefore placed the dog’s
reliability at issue.

Because the State did not show the drug dog was certified or

otherwise reliable, the drug dog’s alert did not, in and of itself, provide probable cause
for the search. The totality of the circumstances also did not provide probable cause.
Thus, the search of the motorhome was illegal.
G.

Mr. Wolfe’s Incriminating Statements Should Have Been Suppressed As The
Fruit Of The Poisonous Tree

Mr. Wolfe asserts his incriminating statements should have been suppressed as the fruit
of the poisonous tree. Under the exclusionary rule, evidence obtained in violation of the
constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures generally may
not be used against victims of the illegal government action. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 81011.

The exclusionary rule “applies to evidence obtained directly from the illegal

government action and to evidence discovered through the exploitation of the original
illegality, or the fruit of the poisonous tree.” Id. at 811. “The test is whether, granting
establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made
has been come at by exploitation of the original illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
alteration omitted).
Here, Mr. Wolfe made the incriminating statements about his drug use and
ownership of the drugs and paraphernalia found in the motorhome only after the officers
committed an illegal search and/or seizure. Specifically, all of Mr. Wolfe’s incriminating
statements came after his illegal seizure by Deputy Nelson. (See R., p.89.) Further,
Mr. Wolfe’s incriminating statements on ownership of the drugs and paraphernalia
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followed the end of the officers’ illegal search of the motorhome. (See R., p.89.) Thus,
the incriminating statements came from exploitation of the original illegality, and should
be suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree. See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 810.
In sum, Mr. Wolfe was seized when Mr. Schabow submitted to Deputy Nelson’s
show of authority. That seizure was illegal because it was not justified by reasonable,
articulable suspicion.

Deputy Nelson’s taking of Mr. Schabow’s license was

unreasonable because it came after the illegal seizure. The search of the motorhome
was illegal because probable cause for the search did not exist.

Mr. Wolfe’s

incriminating statements came from exploitation of the illegal search and/or seizure, and
should have been suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree. Thus, Mr. Wolfe’s
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was violated,
and the district court erred when it denied the motion to suppress. The district court’s
order denying Mr. Wolfe’s motion to suppress should therefore be reversed.
Bishop, 146 Idaho at 821.
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See

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Wolfe respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order
which denied his motion to suppress, vacate the district court’s judgment of conviction,
and remand the case for further proceedings.
DATED this 11th day of January, 2016.

___________/s/______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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